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COMMENTS
MIRANDA v. ARIZONA: THE EMERGING PAITERN
In Miranda v. Arizona,' the United States Supreme Court set forth a
series of specific guidelines to determine the admissibility at trial of statements elicited during police interrogation of a criminal suspect. Since
1971,2 the Burger Court has whittled away at the mandates of Miranda. It
is possible that one major factor underlies this erosion process: the very
frustrating reality that, in many situations, an obviously 3guilty party is
allowed to go free because "the constable has blundered."
Miranda's concrete guidelines were dedicated to preserving individual
liberties and were based upon the sound notion that one cannot fairly be
4
deemed to have waived rights of which he may have had no knowledge. It
1. 384 U.S. 436 (1966). Briefly stated, Miranda held:
[T]he prosecution may not use statements, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, stemming from custodial interrogation of the defendant unless it demonstrates the use of
procedural safeguards effective to secure the privilege against self-incrimination. By
custodial interrogation, we mean questioning initiated by law enforcement officers
after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of
action in any significant way. As for the procedural safeguards to be employed, unless
other fully effective means are devised to inform accused persons of their right of
silence and to assure a continuous opportunity to exercise it, the following measures
are required. Prior to any questioning, the person must be warned that he has a right
to remain silent, that any statement he does make may be used as evidence against
him, and that he has a right to the presence of an attorney, either retained or appointed. The defendant may waive effectuation of these rights, provided the waiver is
made voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently. If, however, he indicates in any manner
and at any stage of the process that he wishes to consult an attorney before speaking
there can be no questioning. Likewise, if the individual is alone and indicates in any
manner that he does not wish to be interrogated, the police may not question him.
Id., at 444.
For a general discussion of Miranda, see Elsen & Rosett, Protectionsfor the Suspect Under
Miranda v. Arizona, 67 COLuM. L. REv. 645 (1967); Kamisar, A Dissent from the Miranda
Dissents: Some Comments on the "New" Fifth Amendment and the Old "Voluntariness"
Test, 65 MICH. L. REv. 59 (1966); Rothblatt & Pitler, Police Interrogation: Warnings and
Waivers-Where Do We Go From Here? 42 NoTRE DAME LAw. 479 (1967). For the viewpoints
of several commentators on the Miranda decision and its implications, see essays collected
in Interrogationof Criminal Defendants-Some Views of Miranda v. Arizona, 35 FORDHAM
L. REV. 169 (1966).
2. In 1971, Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971), was handed down. See note 11 infra,
and accompanying text.
150 N.E. 585, 587 (1926) (Cardozo, J.).
3. People v. Defore, 242 N.Y. 13, -,
4. 384 U.S. at 468-69. The Court further pointed out that "[a]ssessments of the knowledge the defendant possessed, based on information as to his age, education, intelligence, or
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further seeks to safeguard the criminal suspect from having his will overborne, whether by actual abuse 5 or by subtle psychological pressure, 6 to the
point that he confesses to a crime against what would normally be his
better judgment. In many ways, Miranda qualifies as the proverbial hard
case that makes bad law. As ever, when an inflexible guideline is established, there has been a subsequent straining toward a greater flexibility
which would permit the weighing of other meritorious considerations. For
one thing, the government has a duty to secure the individual and his
possessions from the depredations of crime.7 This declared objective is
utterly frustrated when a decision results in the loosing upon society of one
who, with the introduction of his confession, has been found beyond a
reasonable doubt to be guilty of a criminal act.8 The Miranda court apparprior contact with authorities, can never be more than speculation; a warning is a clearcut
fact." Id. (footnotes omitted).
The natural tendency to cooperate with the police may cause a suspect to make an uncoerced statement which, had he any idea what his rights were, he would not have made
voluntarily. This proclivity is what has been termed "ignorance compulsion." Graham, What
Is "Custodial Interrogation?"-California'sAnticipatory Application of Miranda v. Arizona,
14 U.C.L.A. L. Rlv. 59, 76 (1966) [hereinafter cited as Graham].
5. Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503 (1963) (defendant held incommunicado for sixteen
hours and was told he could not call his wife until he signed a confession); Reck v. Pate, 367
U.S. 433 (1961) (sick and poorly fed defendant held incommunicado and interrogated intermittently for four days); Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49 (1949) (defendant held almost a week
in solitary confinement in a cell with no place to sit or sleep, and interrogated by relays of
police far into the night); Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227 (1940) (black defendants questioned by relays of white officers all week and all of one night); Brown v. Mississippi, 297
U.S. 278 (1936) (defendant beaten until he confessed).
6. Lynumn v. Illinois, 372 U.S. 528 (1963) (defendant threatened with deprivation of financial aid for her minor children, and told that they would be taken away from her); Spano v.
New York, 360 U.S. 315 (1959) (foreign-born defendant persistently questioned for eight hours
by prosecutor and police despite repeated requests for counsel); Leyra v. Denno, 347 U.S. 556
(1954) (defendant, complaining of a sinus headache, examined by psychiatrist, who elicited
confession).
7. The most basic function of any government is to provide for the security of the
individual and of his property. These ends of society are served by the criminal laws
which for the most part are aimed at the prevention of crime. Without the reasonably
effective performance of the task of preventing private violence and retaliation, it is
idle to talk about human dignity and civilized values.
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 539 (1966) (White, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
8.
I have no desire whatsoever to share the responsibility for any such impact on the
present criminal process.
In some unknown number of cases the Court's rule will return a killer, a rapist or
other criminal to the streets and to the environment which produced him, to repeat
his crime whenever it pleases him. As a consequence, there will not be a gain, but a
loss, in human dignity. The real concern is not the unfortunate consequences of this
new decision on the criminal law as an abstract, disembodied series of authoritative
proscriptions, but the impact on those who rely on the public authority for protection
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ently considered this to be the necessary price for preserving constitutional
rights. It is understandable that there arises pressure for a result which
would be fair to all. Since the means of accomplishing such a result was
so readily accessible, in some situations, under the pre-Mirandavoluntariness test,' there has been a tendency toward its re-adoption in areas where
a fundamentally fair result would better be achieved under its rationale."0
The Burger Court's decision in Harrisv. New York' was the first indicaand who without it can only engage in violent self-help with guns, knives and the help
of their neighbors similarly inclined. There is, of course, a saving factor: the next
victims are uncertain, unnamed and unrepresented in this case.
Id. at 542-43 (White, J., dissenting).
9. [W]ith over 25 years of precedent the Court has developed an elaborate, sophisticated, and sensitive approach to admissibility of confessions. It is "judicial" in its
treatment of one case at a time, flexible in its ability to respond to the endless mutations of fact presented, and ever more familiar to the lower courts. Of course, strict
certainty is not obtained in this developing process, but this is often so with constitutional principles, and disagreement is usually confined to that borderland of close cases
where it matters least.
Id. at 508-09 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
For articles dealing with the shortcomings of the voluntariness test, see Elsen & Rosett,
Protectionsfor the Suspect Under Mirandav. Arizona, 67 COLUM. L. Rav. 645 (1967); Kamisar, A DissentFrom the MirandaDissents: Some Comments on the "New"Fifth Amendment
and the Old "Voluntariness" Test. 65 MICH. L. Rav. 59, 94-104 (1966); PY, Interrogationof
Criminal Defendants-Some Views on Miranda v. Arizona, 35 FORDHAM L. Rav. 169, 213
(1966). For an interesting insight into the psychology of the confession and how it correlates
with the due process voluntariness test and Miranda's concept of compulsion, see Warden,
Miranda-Some History, Some Observations,and Some Questions, 20 VAND. L. Ray. 39, 4853 (1966).
10. 18 U.S.C. §3501 (1970), enacted in 1968, was intended to offset the harmful effects
Congress thought the Miranda decision would precipitate. The statute provides in part that
failure to comply with Miranda is merely one in the "totality of circumstances" determining
the admissibility of evidence in a federal criminal prosecution. See Kuh, Interrogationof
Criminal Defendants-Some Views on Miranda v. Arizona, 35 FORDHAhi L. REv. 169, 234
(1966). Mr. Kuh feels that few indeed will be the occasions when a confession can be found
admissible under the Miranda decision. If the defendant asserts his right to counsel or to
silence, there will be no confession at all. On the other hand, if he waives his right, the waiver,
because it allows the police access to damaging information, must have been "stupidly
made," since no one acts against his own best interest. Therefore, the waiver would be invalid
as not being "intelligent." Mr. Kuh, noting that the Court might just as well have forbidden
the use of confessions altogether, commented that while this would have resulted in more
adverse public reaction, had the Supreme Court done this, it would at least have been
intellectually honest, and there would be clarity. Id. at 235.
11. 401 U.S. 222, 226 (1971). For an evaluation of the Harris opinion, see Dershowitz &Ely,
Harris v. New York: Some Anxious Observations on the Candorand Logic of the Emerging
Nixon Majority, 80 YALE L.J. 1198 (1971). Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714 (1975), reinforced
and refined the Harris decision. In Hass, it was held that a statement taken in the absence
of an attorney, after the accused had requested one, was admissible for the limited purpose
of impeachment. 420 U.S. at 723-24.
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tion that "voluntary" statements, taken in violation of Miranda, might be
admissible. There, the Court construed Miranda as saying that a defendant's statement, taken in violation of Miranda, could be used to impeach
him after he elected to testify in his own defense. However, the statement
could not be used by the prosecution in proving its case-in-chief.
A second broadening of the admissibility of "voluntary", though custodial, 12 confessions came in Lego v. Twomey. 3 There, the Supreme Court
rejected "beyond a reasonable doubt" as the State's burden of proof on the
issue of voluntariness, adopting instead the "preponderance of evidence"
standard.
The third and major departure from the spirit of Miranda came in
Michigan v. Tucker, 4 where the police neglected to advise the defendant
that an attorney would be appointed for him if he was indigent, though
the other warnings were given. Afterwards, the accused stated, as an alibi,
that he had been with his friend Henderson at the time in question. Henderson's testimony, however, implicated Tucker.
In its analysis, the Court split the issue to be determined into two parts:
(i) whether the failure to give warnings directly infringed upon defendant's
right against self-incrimination, or (ii) whether it instead violated only the
"prophylactic rules" set up by Miranda to protect that right. 5 Under
Tucker, if the right itself were violated, the statement would be excluded;
but if only the procedures were violated, the question remained as to
whether any evidence so derived should be excluded. 6 For the first time,
Miranda's procedural directives were relegated to the position of
"prophylactic rules" and were divorced from the right against selfincrimination as such. 7 The Court determined, using the due process
12. See note 67 infra, and accompanying text.
13. 404 U.S. 477, 486-87 (1972).
14. 417 U.S. 433 (1974). For a more detailed discussion of Tucker, see Note, Michigan v.
Tucker: A Warning About Miranda, 17 Amiz. L. REv. 188 (1975); Note, Michigan v. Tucker:
A Reevaluation of Miranda, 27 ME. L. REv. 365 (1975).
15. 417 U.S. at 439.
16. Id. at 447.
17. 54 N.C.L. REV. 695, 700-01 (1976). One early indication that the Court viewed
Miranda's requirements as "prophylactic rules" came in Michigan v. Payne, 412 U.S. 47
(1973), which considered the retroactive applicability of the due process limitations upon
imposition of a more severe sentence upon re-trial set out in North Carolina v. Pearce, 395
U.S. 711 (1969). Writing for the majority, Mr. Justice Powell drew an analogy between the
Pearce and Miranda sets of "prophylactic rules," noting that they were similar in that each
was designed to preserve the integrity of the criminal process. "While each created a protective umbrella serving to enhance a constitutional guarantee, neither conferred a constitutional right that had not existed prior to those decisions." Id. at 54. Following through with
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"voluntariness" standard, that Tucker's rights had not been infringed and
that the derivative evidence was admissible.
It is in Michigan v. Tucker that some scholars feel they detect a return
to the pre-Miranda voluntariness test. 9 However, although the language
of due process voluntariness does pervade the opinion, 20 these writers may
be premature in using Michigan v. Tucker to conclude that Miranda has
effectively been, or is about to be, overruled' altogether. It must be remembered that the heart of Miranda is a concern that one cannot freely
waive rights of which he is unaware. 2 There is an important policy at work
in the warnings requirement of Miranda-thatof making sure that the
suspect is at least aware of such rights as he does possess, or of reinforcing
his knowledge of them at such a time as he may be prey to all the pressures
and panic which attend being "up to his neck" in trouble with the law. It
is this "educational" purpose of Miranda on which the Burger Court has
shown little desire to turn its back.21 After all, were the Court hostile
toward this laudable object, it could resort to the simple expedient of
broadening its "harmless error" doctrine. 24 The Court has not, however,
operated significantly in this area.2
Where the suspect is either (i) made aware of his rights, or (ii) not up to
the analogy, the Court held Pearcenonretroactive on the example of Johnson v. New Jersey,
384 U.S. 719 (1966), establishing Miranda's non-retroactivity.
18. 417 U.S. at 448-50.
19. Seee.g., Note, Michigan v. Tucker: A Warning about Miranda, 17 ARiz. L. Rav. 188
(1975); Note, Michigan v. Tucker: A Reevaluation of Miranda, 27 ME. L. REv., 365 (1975).
This view of Tucker also underlies the holding in United States v. Crocker, 510 F.2d 1129
(10th Cir. 1975). There, the court noted that since the Supreme Court had not addressed the
constitutionality of 18 U.S.C. § 3501 (1970), Tucker could be construed as an implicit revival
of the totality of circumstances test, in which compliance with Miranda would be only one
factor. 510 F.2d at 1136-38.
20. 417 U.S. at 445-50.
21. The Supreme Court was asked to abandon Miranda during the briefing and arguing
stages of Brewer v. Williams, 97 S. Ct. 1232 (1977). The case was, however, decided entirely
on sixth amendment grounds.
22. See note 4 supra.
23. In Tucker, there was no question that the exculpatory statement was itself inadmissible, although the voluntariness test was applied with reference to the derivative evidence. 417
U.S. at 438-39, 445.
24. See Note, Miranda Warnings and the Harmless Error Doctrine: Comments on the
Indiana Approach, 47 ImN. L. J. 331 (1972); Note, Criminal Procedure-Self-IncriminationHarmless Error-Applicationof the Harmless Error Doctrine to Violations of Miranda: The
California Experience, 69 MicH. L. REv. 941 (1971). See also Chapman v. California, 386 U.S.
18, rehearing denied, 386 U.S. 987 (1967).
25. But see Pennsylvania v. Romberger, 417 U.S. 964 (1974) (Supreme Court vacated and
remanded for consideration in the light of Tucker the state court's finding of error in admission of a signed confession obtained without full warnings).
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his neck in trouble with the law, and the strict adherence to the letter of
Miranda would still operate to bar his confession, the Court has apparently
had some problem reconciling that sort of result with its awareness of
society's interest in the effective apprehension of criminals. 6 Since late
1975,2 there have been significant narrowings in the areas of involuntariness upon re-interrogation, and in determining what constitutes
"custody," the setting which would operate to negate voluntariness.
The reintroduction of a more flexible "voluntariness" based test in
place of Miranda's inflexible strictures has become apparent in the area
of "re-interrogation"-questioning a suspect after he has asserted either
his right to remain silent or his right to the presence of counsel. The
relevant portions of Miranda provide that "[o]nce warnings have been
given, the subsequent procedure is clear. If the individual indicates in any
manner, at any time prior to or during questioning, that he wishes to
remain silent, the interrogation must cease." 9 Similarly, when counsel is
requested, Miranda says "[i]f the individual states that he wants an
attorney, the interrogation must cease until an attorney is present."30
Most of the federal and state courts which have had an opportunity to
consider the matter have rejected the contention that Miranda created a
per se proscription of further interrogation once these rights were invoked .3
However, defendants have occasionally argued, with some success, that
Miranda mandates a blanket prohibition against the taking of "voluntary
statements", regardless of the circumstances. 32 Under this reasoning, some
results could be reached which offend both the commonsense3 and preced24

ent.

26. For an indication of how two of the current members of the Supreme Court have viewed
the problem, see notes 7 and 9 supra.
27. In December of 1975, Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96 (1975), was handed down. See
note 35 infra, and accompanying text.
28. The test in use prior to Miranda determined voluntariness from the totality of circumstances. E.g., Payne v. Arkansas, 356 U.S. 560 (1958). The test was also used to decide
whether the admission of confessions taken after a suspect had ended the interrogation by
asserting one of his rights was violative of due process. E.g., United States v. Slaughter, 366
F.2d 833 (4th Cir. 1966).
29. 384 U.S. at 473-74.
30. Id. at 474.
31. For articles collecting and categorizing cases with reference to such considerations as
which right was invoked, whether interrogation pertained to same crime, etc., see Comment,
Michigan v. Mosley: A FurtherErosion of Miranda, 13 SAN DiEGo L. Rav. 861 (1976).
32. Strickland v. Garrison, No. 76-1683 (4th Cir., June 28, 1976). See note 31 supra.
33. [A] blanket prohibition against the taking of voluntary statements or a permanent immunity from further interrogation, regardless of the circumstances, would
transform the Miranda safeguards into wholly irrational obstacles to legitimate police
investigative activity, and deprive suspects of an opportunity to make informed and
intelligent assessments of their interests.
Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 102 (1975).
34. Id. at 108 (White, J., concurring), citing Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258 (1973);
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In Michigan v. Mosley,3 the United States Supreme Court determined
that the fruits of questioning a suspect after he expressed a desire to remain silent were admissible evidence so long as it was shown that the
police had "scrupulously honored" 36 the right of the accused to cut off
questioning. The defendant Mosley, after having been arrested and given
his Miranda warnings, stated that he did not want to answer any questions
about the robberies with which he was charged. The officer ceased questioning, but some two hours later a different officer led Mosley into an
interrogation room, and again read him his rights. Mosley then waived his
37
rights and, during the ensuing conversation, he confessed.
At trial, Mosley contended that the second interrogation constituted a
violation of his right against self-incrimination in that his desire to remain
silent was not respected.3 1 Interpreting the passage from Miranda which
states that interrogation must cease once the accused asserts his right to
silence,391 Justice Stewart, writing for the majority, rejected the notion that
"this passage or any other in the Miranda opinion can sensibly be read to
create a per se proscription of indefinite duration upon further questioning." 4 Speaking of the right to cut off questioning as a "critical safeguard,"'" he concluded that the admissibility under Mirandaof statements
obtained after the assertion of this right hinged upon whether the assertion
was "scrupulously honored." The Court provided no enlightenment as to
exactly what "scrupulously honored" was to mean, but it did find that the
officer's conduct in Mosley passed muster.42
In reaching this conclusion, the court weighed several different factors:
the meticulous administration of the warnings prior to each interrogation
Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742 (1970); McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759 (1970);
and Parker v. North Carolina, 397 U.S. 790 (1970).
Justice White goes on to express his reluctance to conclude that Miranda stands for the
proposition that a man may be imprisoned in his own privileges, stating that to do so would
be to disregard that respect for the individual which is the lifeblood of the law. He points
out that the Court has, in the past, rejected any "paternalistic rule protecting a defendant
from his intelligent and voluntary decisions about his own criminal case." 423 U.S. at 109,
citing Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975). Farettaheld that a state may not constitutionally force a defendant in a criminal trial to accept the assistance of counsel, when he
voluntarily and intelligently elects to proceed without it. 422 U.S. at 835-36.
35. 423 U.S. 96 (1975).
36. Id. at 104 (footnote omitted).
37. Id. at 97-98.
38. Id. at 98-99.
39. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 473-74 (1966).
40. 423 U.S. at 102-03.
41. Id. at 103-04.
42. Id. at 104-06.
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session, Mosley's understanding of his rights, the immediate cessation of
questioning following the first exercise of the right to remain silent, the
"significant" time period between Mosley's assertion of the right and the
re-interrogation, 3 the different locations and officers, the difference in the
subject matter of each inquiry, and the absence of any attempt to wear
down Mosley's resistance."
Justice White, in his concurring opinion,45 interpreted the Court's reliance upon the particular facts of Mosley as a step toward the reacceptance
of the "totality of circumstances" test used prior to Miranda to determine
voluntariness. 6 Noting that the trend was established, Justice White advocated an immediate return to the voluntariness test.47 The difference, however, is merely one of orientation. While the Court's "scrupulously honored" test addresses the activities of the government agents themselves,
the voluntariness approach is defendant-oriented. Perhaps the adoption of
the government-oriented standard aims at avoiding a possible recurrence
of the pre-Miranda ambiguity in the area of self-incriminations which
attended factual findings of voluntariness,48 especially since temptation to
introduce elements of the subjective is strong. 9
The holding of Michigan v. Mosley has not, however, been applied to
achieve any consistency of reasoning among cases which involve interrogations of a suspect after he has asserted his right to counsel. The Mosley
Court itself points out that it does not purport to deal with the procedures
to be followed in such a situation." It can be contended, too, that the
procedures to be followed when the right to counsel is invoked 5 are set
forth with greater clarity and rigidity than those to be followed when the
43. About two hours had elapsed. But see Westover v. United States, 384 U.S. 436, 496
(1966) (re-interrogation deemed to be part of same interrogation); United States v. Clark, 499
F.2d 802, 807 (4th Cir. 1974) (four hours not a "significant period").
44. 423 U.S. 96, 105-07 (1975).
45. "I suspect that in the final analysis the majority will adopt voluntariness as the
standard by which to judge the waiver of the right to silence by a properly informed defendant. I think the Court should say so now." 423 U.S. at 108. Justice White's chief objection
to the majority's test is, that in some cases, an entirely voluntary confession could be excluded
because of the questionable actions of law enforcement officers. Id. at 107.
46. See Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503 (1963).
47. See note 45 supra.
48. 54 N.C. L. REv. 695, 704 n.64 (1976). As a practical matter the case load on appeal
would be lessened under the "scrupulously honored" test, for factual findings in the trial court
that the standard has been met would be difficult to overturn. Id.
49. See Hicks v. United States 382 F.2d 158 (D.C. Cir. 1967). See generallyLaFave, "Street
Encounters" and the Constitution: Terry, Sibron, Peters, and Beyond, 67 MIcH. L. REv. 39,
100 (1968).
50. 423 U.S. at 101 n.7.
51. See note 29 supra, and accompanying text.
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right to silence is asserted.52 The former more nearly resembles a per se
proscription against further interrogation." Re-interrogation after an assertion of the right to counsel is further complicated by Sixth Amendment
considerations. Some fact situations could indicate that the interrogating
officer, while holding the suspect apart from counsel, for the length of time
necessary to conduct the re-interrogation, is in effect depriving him of his
right to the presence of counsel without a valid waiver of that right." The
distinction, however, does not foreclose the possibility that Mosley may
influence the way in which lower courts interpret Miranda in cases where
counsel has been demanded. Again, the movement would be away from the
more rigid procedural rules and toward the "totality of circumstances"
treatment tacitly endorsed in Mosley.
Mosley's influence may underlie the recent 4th Circuit decision in
United States v. Grant." Defendant Grant was taken into custody by
police in Loris, South Carolina, in connection with a local bank robbery.
An FBI agent advised Grant of his rights and received a written waiver of
them before an interrogation session regarding the Loris bank robbery.
Afterwards, the agent learned that Grant was charged in connection with
a Richmond bank robbery. He again visited Grant advising him that he
was also under arrest for the Richmond robbery. When Grant denied any
involvement, he was read his Miranda warnings, with careful explanation
52. See note 30 supra, and accompanying text.
that when it wanted to create a per se rule against further
53. The Court showed ...
interrogation after assertion of a right, it knew how to do so. The Court there said "[i]f
the individual indicates that he wants an attorney, the interrogation must cease until
an attorney is present." However, when the individual indicates that he will decide
unaided by counsel whether or not to assert his "rights to silence" the situation is
different.
Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 109-10 (1975) (White, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
54. Brewer v. Williams, 96 S. Ct. 1232 (1977) presents a clear example of such a situation.
After turning himself in, defendant Williams was to be driven from Davenport, Iowa to Des
Moines, a distance of 160 miles. Williams had already consulted by telephone with
McKnight, his lawyer in Des Moines, and while in Davenport was represented by Kelly.
McKnight and Kelly reached an agreement with the police that Williams was not to be
questioned until he arrived in Des Moines and had an opportunity to confer further with
McKnight. Both lawyers also cautioned Williams not to discuss the crime during the trip.
However, the police denied Kelly permission to ride back to Des Moines with Williams. Once
underway, they initiated a line of conversation designed to extract incriminating statements
and conduct from Williams. Writing for the majority, Justice Stewart expressly declined to
review Miranda, confining the opinion entirely to the sixth amendment issue. Viewing the
conduct of the police as a calculated bad faith attempt to isolate the vulnerable defendant
from his attorneys, the Court found that the right to counsel had not been waived and
affirmed the Eighth Circuit's order for a new trial, excluding the statements and behavior of
the defendant on the return trip.
55. 549 F.2d 942 (4th Cir. 1977).
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of certain words and phrases, and Grant executed a written waiver. When
asked about the Richmond robbery, Grant replied that he had nothing to
do with it, and requested a lawyer. At that point, the interrogation about
the robbery ceased, and standard identification information was sought
from him. When this information was given, Grant began asking what
would happen to him, and whether he would be taken back to Richmond.
It was explained that he would be taken before a magistrate who would
appoint counsel for him and fix bond. Grant continued to ask whether he
would be taken to Richmond, what would be the proceedings there, and
"what was going on in Richmond." He was told briefly that four people
were being held in connection with the Richmond robbery. As the agents
prepared to leave, Grant suddenly said "it is all true." The agents again
advised Grant of his rights, and reminded him that he had asked for a
lawyer. Grant said he was aware of his rights, but that he wanted to make
a statement to the agents at that time. Thereupon, he gave a full account
of the circumstances of the robbery.
The Grant court noted that Miranda imposed upon the investigating
officers a duty to cease questioning the accused about the crime under
investigation once the right to councel had been asserted. However, the
court seemed to focus-not on defining the officers' duty and determining
whether or not they had carried it out-but on whether the waiver of the
previously asserted right to counsel had been voluntary. The behavior of
the FBI agents was only one factor, albeit an important one, in determining that voluntariness. 6 The Grant court's attempt to reconcile its reasoning with Miranda'sprocedural orientation seems interestingly at odds with
the true basis of its decision, which was a judgment that, in the light of
all the circumstances, Grant waived his right to counsel voluntarily and
in the exercise of his informed and unfettered judgment. The court pointed
out that Miranda, rather than erecting a per se bar against any conversation with an accused after a request for counsel, only inhibits interrogation
related to the crime itself. In the Grant court's words, Miranda was concerned only "with protecting the suspect against interrogation of an investigative nature rather than the obtaining of basic identifying data required
for booking and arraignment."" But Grant makes no attempt to reconcile
the permissibility of the ensuing crime-related conversation with
56. Id. at 946, citing United States v. Crisp, 435 F.2d 354, 357 (7th Cir. 1970), cert. denied,
402 U.S. 947 (1971).
57. 549 F.2d at 946, quoting United States ex rel. Hines v. LaVallee, 521 F.2d 1109, 1113
(2nd Cir. 1975), cert. denied sub. nom. Hines v. Bombard, 423 U.S. 1090 (1976). Accord,
United States v. Menichino, 497 F.2d 935 (5th Cir. 1974) (statement made during taking of
biographical data); United States v. La Monica, 472 F.2d 580 (9th Cir. 1972) (statements
made with reference to personal items, which were being inventoried).
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Miranda'simperatives,58 and it was during that conversation, rather than
during the booking procedures, that the confession occured. It appears,
then, that the accent in Grant is not on the letter of Miranda but on
whether a voluntary waiver of a previously asserted right could be found
by the totality of circumstances. Grantis consistent with the results in two
earlier 4th Circuit cases, United States v. Slaughter,5 decided on preMirandaprinciples, and United States v. Clark," in that it indicates that
in a determination of voluntariness great weight is to be placed upon who
initiated the conversation leading to the confession. It should be noted
that, in the earlier cases, the heavy burden of establishing the voluntariness of the waiver had not been met. The holding in Grant represents an
especially significant departure from Miranda's procedural orientation in
its recurrence to a voluntariness formula in the context of a direct exchange
between officer and suspect concerning the crime.
The influence of Mosley's "totality of circumstances" philosophy on
Grant emerges more clearly when it is compared with an earlier decision
involving somewhat similar facts. In Strickland v. Garrison,8 the defendant, after being appraised of his rights and invited to make a statement,
replied that he wanted a lawyer. Interrogation ceased. Six hours later, the
agent re-appeared, again read Strickland his rights, and asked if he wanted
to make a statement. This time the defendant, acknowledging his understanding of the rights, confessed. No lawyer was present. Staunchly adhering to the letter of Miranda, the Fourth Circuit held:
Once a suspect in custody has expressed his wish to be represented by counsel, the police must deal with him as if he is thus represented. Thereafter, it
is improper for the police to initiate any communication with the suspect
other than through his legal representative, even for the limited purpose of
58. The fact that the crime-related conversation was not interrogatory in nature is probably
irrelevant. So sophisticated are the psychologically compelling techniques used by police that
the bar does not operate only upon that which is grammatically structured as a question. See
United States v. Grant, 549 F.2d 942, 949-50 (4th Cir. 1977) (Winter, J., concurring and
336 A.2d 423, 428 (1975),
dissenting); Commonwealth v. Richard, 233 Pa. Super 254, -,
cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1017 (1975). See generally Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
59. 366 F.2d 833 (4th Cir. 1966).
60. 499 F.2d 802 (4th Cir. 1974). Both Clark and Slaughter,see note 59 supra, were decided
with reference to a voluntariness standard. In both, the urging to forego counsel was more
adamant and for that reason, the waiver of counsel upon re-interrogation was found invalid.
It is interesting to note that the method for determining voluntariness under Clark bears
some resemblance to Mosley's police-oriented "scrupulously honored" test. "The standard of
voluntariness is not whether the accused was coerced in traditional terms, but whether appropriate safeguards were taken to safeguard his rights and to insure that his statements were
the product of free choice." 499 F.2d at 906.
61. No. 76-1683 (4th Cir., June 28, 1976).
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seeking to persuade him to reconsider his decision to insist on the presence
of counsel."
The Strickland court did observe that a suspect might subsequently elect
a change of heart must
to proceed without counsel, but insisted that such
3
be communicated on the suspect's initiative.1
The degree of prodding, and who started the conversation are, of course,
obvious factual differences between Grant and Strickland.But the important distinction is the underlying rationale of each case. Under the
Strickland approach, which emphasizes Miranda'srigid procedural safeguards, the relatively innocuous activities of the agents in Grant would
have likely sufficed to render the confession inadmissible." Whether the
Strickland waiver would have been found acceptable under the Grant
5
approach is less certain. Even if Mosley applied, a "scrupulous honoring"
might not be found. What is significant is that under the Grant test, a fact
situation could arise in which such a consideration as who began the conversation is outweighed by other factors pointing toward voluntariness.
What amounts to such "custody" as would cause the giving of warnings
67
6
to become a prerequisite to interrogation is a very broad issue. Miranda
itself affords little assistance in determinating the exact parameters of the
concept of custody.6 8 In Miranda it was held: "[b]y custodial interrogation we mean questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a
person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom
of action in any significant way."6 " All that is certain about the scope of
"custodial" is that one actually under arrest at a police station is certainly
62. Id.
63. Id. To support this point, the Strickland court cited United States v. Tafoya, 459 F.2d
424 (10th Cir. 1972).
64. See No. 76-1683 (4th Cir., June 28, 1976) (Winter, J., concurring and dissenting).
65. 423 U.S. 96, 104 (1975).
66. What constitutes interrogation is an entire issue unto itself, for if a statement is not
the product of interrogation, whether or not it was made "in custody" is irrelevant. See
Smith, The Threshhold Question in Applying Miranda: What Constitutes Custodial
Interrogation?, 25 S.C. L. Rv. 699, 702-6 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Smith].
67. See generally Annot., 31 A.L.R. 3d 565 (1970). This lengthy annotation collects cases
treating the concept of custody as applied to every imaginable setting.
68. Miranda and its companion cases all involved incommunicado interrogation in a
police-dominated atmosphere. Since these settings easily qualified as custody, no detailed
analysis of being deprived of one's freedom of action in a significant way was necessary.
Comment, CustodialInterrogation, 35 TENN. L. Rzv. 604, 605 (1968). It has been theorized
that the Court may have been reluctant to define "custodial interrogation" completely until
experience could reveal the exact scope of the problem with which the definition would be
concerned. Graham, note 4 supra, at 63.
69. 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966) (footnote omitted).
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in a custodial situation. 0 It is the phrase "deprived of his freedom of action
in any significant way"'" which has precipitated the problems.
Some early cases took the position that any deprivation of freedom presented the danger of inherent coerciveness." So broad a reading of Miranda
is clearly inaccurate, for the Court intended Miranda to apply only to
"significant" deprivations.73
Other state and federal courts have, rather mechanically, applied the
fact situations of Miranda and its companion cases as the touchstone for
determining what is "custodial." Finding no comparable atmosphere, they
have ruled Miranda inapplicable.
Generally, the trend has been in the direction of an objective definition
of "custodial." 5 Like the "scrupulously honored" test, the objective test
concerns itself with the actions or words of law enforcement officers. Under
this test, something the officer does or says 70must cause the defendant
reasonably to believe that he is not free to go.

The importance of the notion of custody lies only in its relation to the
voluntariness of a waiver of rights. The idea is that the custodial situation,
being inherently coercive, is psychologically operative in overcoming the
will of the suspect.7 Consistent with its tendancy to broaden the horizons
70. Smith, note 66 supra, at 706.
71. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966).
72. E.g., People v. Allen, 50 Misc.2d 897, 272 N.Y.S.2d 249 (Sup. Ct. 1966) (Sobel, J.),
reu'd, 281 N.Y.S.2d 602 (1967).
73. The Court changed its opinion in three places between the printing of the advance
sheets and the final form, so that the phrase "in any significant way" would always modify
the deprivation of freedom of action." Comment, Custodial Interrogation,35 TENN.L. REv.
604, 610 (1968).
74. See Comment, CustodialInterrogation, 35 TENN. L. Rzv. 604, 606-7 (1968) and cases
cited therein.
75. Smith, note 66 supra, at 732.
76. United States v. Hall, 421 F.2d 540, 544-45 (2nd Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 990
(1970); United States v. Bekowies, 432 F.2d 8, 12 (9th. Cir. 1970). The test is often phrased
in terms of the "reasonable man." Lowe v. United States, 407 F.2d 1391, 1397 (9th Cir. 1969).
In applying its "reasonable man, innocent of any crime" test, the New York Court noted that
the test provided an advantage in that it disregarded all the extraordinary frailties and
sensitivities of the individual. People v. P., 21 N.Y.2d 1, 233 N.E.2d 255, 286 N.Y.S.2d 225
(1967).
77. United States v. Gibson, 392 F.2d 373, 375 (4th Cir. 1968). In Gibson, an officer saw a
car matching the description of one he knew to have been stolen sitting in front of a bar. Going
inside, he approached the defendant, whose identity was known to him and asked him to
come outside. The officer asked the defendant (i) where he lived, (ii) how long he had been
in town, (iii) whether he owned the car, (iv) how he had gotten into town, (v)whether he
was employed, and (vi) whether he owned the car in question. Despite the absence of Miranda
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of "voluntariness", the Burger Court has begun to narrow the idea of
what constitutes a custodial setting in which voluntariness is impossible.
The Supreme Court read Miranda more narrowly in Oregon v.
Mathiason.5 There the defendant, a parolee, was the only person the victim could think of who might have committed the burglary. About twentyfive days after the burglary, after having tried without success to contact
the defendant, the officer who was conducting the investigation, finally left
his card with a note asking defendant to call him to "discuss something."
The defendant called, and agreed to meet with the officer at the State
Patrol Office an hour and a half later. When the defendant arrived, he was
told that he was not under arrest, but that the police believed that he was
involved in the burglary. The officer added, falsely, that the defendant's
fingerprints were found at the scene. The defendant then admitted taking
the property, whereupon he was advised of his rights and a taped confession was taken. The officer then told the defendant that he was not under
arrest at that time, and, after a half hour, the defendant departed.
The Oregon Supreme Court held the confession to have been the product
of custodial interrogation. For that reason Mirandawarnings were required
regardless of the fact that the defendant came to the office in response to
a mere request, and despite his understanding that he was not under
arrest. 9
The United States Supreme Court reversed in a per curiam opinion,
pointing out that a "custodial" situation within the meaning of Miranda
is not created merely because the questioning took place in the normally
coercive environment of a station house."0 In light of the absence of a formal
arrest or any restraint on freedom of movement, the traditional
"coerciveness" of such a place was lacking.
Justice Marshall, dissenting, accused the Court of making its determination that "custodial interrogation" was not present on the basis of the
"formality" that Mathiason was not under arrest at the time. At the very
least, Marshall insisted, Miranda called for an objective determination of
the reasonableness of the defendant's believing, in such a situation, that
he was free to go."1
warnings, the statements were held admissible: "In the complete absence of the element of
coercion, actual or potential, or police dominance of the individual's will, the mild police
activity shown here should not prevent the introduction of statements freely made. The evils
with which the Court was concerned in Miranda are not present here." Id. at 376.
78. 97 S. Ct. 711 (1977).
79. State v. Mathiason, 275 Or. 1, 549 P.2d 673 (1976).
80. 97 S. Ct. 711 (1977). Accord, United States v. Weston, 417 F.2d 181, 186-87 (4th Cir.
1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1062 (1970).
81. 97 S. Ct. at 714-15.
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While it is not clear from the per curiam opinion exactly what underlay
the Court's decision, Marshall's fear of a purely mechanical "no arrest,
ergo, no custody" formula seems unjustified. Had the Court intended such
a holding, it could simply have said as much. Actually, the Court weighed
the voluntariness of the defendant's presence, the fact that he did leave
freely and the irrelevance of the false statement regarding the fingerprints
to any determination of how coercive the environment was. Apparently,
the Court merely applied the objective test to determine whether the setting was custodial, but did not draw the line in as protective a fashion as
did the dissent.
Another narrowing of the concept of custody was evident in Beckwith v.
United States 2 in which the viability of the "focus" test of custodial interrogation was finally laid to rest. The "focus test", which had its inception
in Escobedo v. Illinois,3 held that certain rights accrued when an
"investigation is no longer a general inquiry into an unsolved crime, but
has begun to focus on a particular suspect." 4 Because of the familiarity of
the test at the time Miranda came out some courts inferred that it should
be employed to fix the point at which the necessity for Miranda warnings
accrued." The Miranda Court contributed to this proclivity by the insertion, after the definition of custodial interrogation, of the famous "obfuscating footnote": "This is what we meant in Escobedo when we spoke
of an investigation which had focused on an accused.",,
This footnote is apparently intended to render coextensive the situations
in which Escobedo's right to counsel and Miranda's right to warnings
accrue. Thus for the purpose of the opinion either focus means custody, or
custody means focus.' The question then arises as to which concept provides the controlling definition, since from a logical standpoint, it does not
seem that the focus test and deprivation of "freedom of action in any
significant way"88 can be squared."
82. 425 U.S. 341 (1976).
83. 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
84. Id. at 490.
85. See Windsor v. United States, 389 F.2d 530 (5th Cir. 1968); Commonwealth v. Sites,
427 Pa. 486, 235 A.2d 387 (1967).
86. So-described by Professor Graham, note 4 supra, at 114.
87. 384 U.S. at 444 n.4.
88. See Hall v. United States, 421 F.2d 540 (2nd Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 990

(1970).
89. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966).
90. Smith, note 66 supra, at 707. The incongruity is especially significant when an investigation has begun to zero in on a defendant who had not been taken into custody. In People
v. McKie, 25 N.Y.2d 19, 250 N.E.2d 36, 302 N.Y.S.2d 534 (1969), for example, defendant had
been investigated for a murder, but sufficient evidence had not been found. During the
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The alternative construction has been to recognize that custody and
focus cover separate, although overlapping areas. When both custody and
focus exist, or where neither exists, there has been no trouble determining
the applicability of Miranda. Similarly, when custody exists, but not focus,
the plain dictate of Miranda governs. Only where an investigation has
focused on a suspect not in a "custodial setting" does the "obfuscating
footnote" cause difficulty. In this situation, most state and lower federal
courts have declined to apply Miranda."
2
United States v. Hall"
sets forth a moderate position on this issue.
There, Judge Friendly pointed out that custody as well as focus were
essential elements of Escobedo, while custody alone was clearly sufficient
to invoke the need for warnings under Miranda. Since it could not see any
sensible way to conclude that "focus" alone would be enough to bring
Miranda into play, the court decided that "focus means custody, not that
custody means focus." Under the Hall analysis, however, the degree of
focus bears upon whether the interrogation has taken on an investigatory
or accusatory character." Focus, then, would be one factor aiding in a
determination of whether or not there has been a significant deprivation
94
of freedom of action.

In Beckwith v. United States95 the Supreme Court settled the focussubsequent fourteen months, police would follow the defendant from time to time. Finally,
the defendant approached the police and told them that he had killed the victim but that
they might as well stop following him around because they would never be able to prove it.
The court found no custody, because there was no deprivation of the suspect's freedom of
action; but clearly he was the "focus" of investigations of that particular crime.
91. Lowe v. United States, 407 F.2d 1391 (9th Cir. 1969); Jordan v. Commonwealth, 216
Va. 768, 222 S.E.2d 573 (1976). The leading case rejecting the focus test is Lowe v. United
States, 407 F.2d 1391 (9th Cir. 1969). There, it was held that the court's decision in Miranda
"clearly abandoned" focus of investigation as a test to determine when rights attach in
confession cases. Id. at 1396. The Lowe opinion made it clear that what the officer knew about
the defendant's guilt, or whether the officer intended to take defendant into custody was
irrelevant to a determination of whether the defendant reasonably perceived himself as being
"in custody." Id. at 1397. In effect, the Lowe court applied an objective test to determine
custody. On the other hand, some courts have accepted the focus test as determinative. See
Windsor v. United States, 389 F.2d 530 (5th Cir. 1968).
92. 421 F.2d 540 (2nd Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 990 (1970). In Hall, the defendant
willingly let FBI agents into his apartment for questioning. The agents' only connection with
the defendant was the reported presence of his automobile at the victim bank the morning
of the robbery. The Hall court, objectively found that there was no custody.
93. Id. at 543.
94. Cf. Brown v. Beto, 468 F.2d 1284, 1286 (5th Cir. 1972); United States v. Phelps, 443
F.2d 246, 247-48 (5th Cir. 1971) (the Fifth Circuit approach, the so-called "focus-plus" test,
recognizes the degree of focus as the single most significant factor in determining whether a
defendant is in custody).
95. 425 U.S. 341 (1976).
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custody dilemma, making "custody", as defined in Miranda,96 the sole
determinant of when the right to receive warnings accrues." The opinion,
however, apparently did not embrace Judge Friendly's approach whereby
"focus" was one factor in determining custody by an objective standard.
In fact, Beckwith might even be construed to presage the discreditation of
the objective test of custody altogether, in favor of expanded parameters
of voluntariness. In Beckwith, IRS agents98 came to the home of petitioner's friend and advised petitioner that they were investigating his federal income tax liability for certain years. Though they gave no full
Miranda warnings, they did apprise petitioner of some of his rights, reading to him from a printed card. Testimony indicated that the conversation was friendly and relaxed, and that petitioner was not pressed for
information.' 9
In compliance with the request of one of the agents to see petitioner's
records, petitioner met the agents at his place of employment some 45
minutes later. Although petitioner was advised that he was not required
to furnish any books or records, he supplied the books to the agents.
Prior to his trial for attempting to evade or defeat federal income tax,
the petitioner moved to suppress the statements he made to the agents and
any evidence derived from those statements on the grounds that he had
not been given Miranda warnings.'"' The petitioner, in a two-pronged appoach, claimed that his confession fell within the ambit of Miranda.
96. 384 U.S. at 444.
97. 425 U.S. at 344-48. This result is consistent with the only previous clue as to the
Supreme Court's view of the focus-custody controversy. In Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S.
293, 309-10 (1966), the Court indicated that whether the police have probable cause to arrest
has no relation to when the suspect's right to receive warnings attaches.
98. Because agents of the IRS have both civil and criminal investigative functions, and
because such investigations seldom result in custody, some decisions, notably those of the
7th Circuit, have applied the "focus" test of custody to IRS situations. However, even the
7th Circuit has expressly limited the rule to the IRS context. See United States v. Sicilia,
475 F. 2d 308, 310-11 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 865 (1973).
99. Under the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, I cannot
compel you to answer any questions or to submit any information if such answers or
information might tend to incriminate you in any way. I also advise you that anything
which you say and any information which you submit may be used against you in any
criminal proceeding which may be undertaken. I advise you further that you may, if
you wish, seek the assistance of an attorney before responding.
425 U.S. 341, 344, (1976).
100. The court noted that Beckwith did not challenge the holding of the Court of Appeals
(United States v. Beckwith, 510 F.2d 741, 743 (1975)) that, aside from the Mirandaquestion,
the "entire interview was free of coercion." 425 U.S. at 344 n.4.
101. 425 U.S. at 344.
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First, petitioner argued that, since cases are only assigned to the Intelligence Division of the IRS when there is an indication of criminal fraud, he
was clearly the "focus" of investigation at the time of the interview. The
Supreme Court, rejecting this contention, construed Miranda to say that,
for its purposes, "focus" meant "questioning initiated by law enforcement
officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived
of his freedom of action in any significant way."' 10 This, of course, is the
definition the Miranda court gives custody.' 3 Thus, like Judge Friendly in
Hall,'14 the Supreme Court concluded that focus means custody for
Miranda purposes. Unlike Hall, there is no mention of whether focus, as
defined in Escobedo'05 should be a factor weighed in determining whether
a setting is custodial.
The court's response to petitioner's second contention is particularly
indicative of the trend to constrict the applicability of Miranda and to
expand the parameters of the pre-Miranda "totality-of-circumstances"
test for voluntariness.
Petitioner contended that, given the complexity of the tax structure, and
the fact that tax offenders are rarely placed in pretrial custody, the
"psychological restraints" attendant upon his situation constituted the
functional, and therefore legal, equivalent of custody. Thus, his situation
mandated Miranda warnings.'
In making this argument, the petitioner put forth the same sort of reasoning apparent in some lower court holdings.'0 This rationale is rooted
in Miranda's stated policy, that its special safeguards were designed to
counterbalance the coercion inherent in a custodial setting.'," Since coercion is the evil with which Miranda sought to grapple, the requirement of
warnings in settings where a suspect could reasonably feel coerced, although not literally deprived of his freedom of action, would be consistent
with the spirit of Miranda. Thus, the emphasis should be on the coercive,
rather than the custodial, nature of the setting.' 9 By accepting this argument, the Court could have kept such situations as petitioner's within the
102. Id. at 347.
103. See note 69, supra.
104. See note 92 and accompanying text, supra.
105. See note 83, supra.
106. 425 U.S. at 345.
107. E.g., United States v. Caiello, 420 F.2d 471, 473 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S.
1039 (1970); People v. Arnold, 66 Cal.2d 438, 426 P.2d 515, 58 Cal. Rptr. 115 (1967).
108. 384 U.S. at 458. See Nail v. Slayton, 353 F. Supp. 1013, 1017-18 (W.D. Va. 1972)
(dictum).
109. See, e.g., United States v. Harrison, 265 F. Supp. 660 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
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circumference of Miranda while adopting the majority stance with regard
to "focus." However, the Beckwith Court made it clear that non-custodial
settings fall within the province of due-process determination under the
voluntariness test. In its broader sense, then, Beckwith could be interpreted as an indication that in many of the cases where the psychological,
rather than the physical sort of retraint was held to justify invoking
Miranda,the proper determination with regard to the admissibility of the
confession should have been made through the voluntariness test rather
than by inquiring for "custodial" interrogation under Miranda. The impact of this dictum may be felt in future determinations of custody by an
objective test.
Placed in context with Michigan v. Mosley and Oregon v. Mathiason,
Beckwith exemplifies the emerging pattern of the Supreme Court's curtailment of Miranda's protective procedures. Miranda was designed to maximize an individual's right to exercise free and informed judgment while
in the frightening position of being suspected of criminal conduct. To
accomplish its goal, Miranda set forth concrete guidelines which, when
given only moderately strict construction, became absolutely definitive of
the admissibility or inadmissibility of confessions, incriminating utterances, or other crime-related statements to prove the government's case.
The inflexibility of these guidelines renders it entirely possible that truly
"voluntary" waivers could be excluded from evidence or lead to reversal
of the convictions. Ultimately, it has become clear that, in certain areas,
strict adherance to Miranda has accomplished little genuine benefit to the
rights of the suspect, while adding greatly to the burdens of law enforcement officers. It is in these areas that the Burger Court has acted to erode
Miranda.
Miranda'smajor departure from the due process voluntariness standard
lay in its recognition that only when one is aware of his rights can he fairly
be deemed capable of waiving them. For the properly informed suspect,
however, the "totality of circumstances" test affords sufficient assurance
that a waiver is voluntary. It is difficult to see what more is accomplished
by erecting an absolute bar to questioning of one who understands his
rights, and in fact, has asserted one of them. Undue pressure from government agents to induce him to change his mind would still run afoul of due
process. From a law enforcement officer's point of view, the requirement
of immediate cessation is a procedural quagmire toward which he must
continually bend a wary eye. The individual suspect gains nothing from
such procedural niceties. Understandably, the Burger Court, in Michigan
v. Mosley, has cut back on the strictures of Miranda in this area.
Similarly, when a suspect is not significantly under government control,
the responsibility for assuring that he is educated as to his rights should
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not, in fairness, rest so heavily on the shoulders of law enforcement officers.
To impose so high a penalty upon their failure to give warnings would
seriously impair their progress in solving and preventing crime. Oregon v.
Mathiason and Beckwith v. United States have operated to relieve officeis
of their "educational" responsibility in such situations by assuming that
"custody" bears a more direct correlation to physical control and involves
less guesswork as to when the subject may reasonably feel coerced.
Miranda, like everything else, is most assailable at its weak points; the
heart of Miranda, which is its strength, remains unimpaired. Ultimately,
Miranda's exclusionary rule has three major purposes: to assert the logical
position that a suspect cannot waive rights of which he has no knowledge;
to deter police misconduct; and to assure that a suspect is not coerced into
incriminating himself falsely. Of these three purposes, two are adequately
served by the due process voluntariness test. Only the "educational" benefits of Miranda would be lost by reducing the warnings to merely one
among a totality of circumstances to be weighed in finding voluntariness.
But the "educational" function of the warnings, has continuing merit and
vitality. Lacking an adequate substitute therefor, it is difficult to imagine
that the Burger Court would venture to rescind Miranda-andthus turn
its back on the genuine benefits of ten years of this "educational" requirement-without much soul-searching.
Evelyn G. Skaltsounis

